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abstract
After the colossal financial crisis of2008, many monetary policy analyses have
shown the profound implications for financial stability of monetary policy in a
liquidity trap. This paper investigates how monetary policy in a liquidity trap
affects financial stability in a New Keynesian model incorporating a financial
friction. The main findings are as follows : A strong financial stabilization
policy is effective in mitigating an excess expansion of credit in normal times.
However, this same stabilization policy expands credit when the economy is in a
liquidity trap. These findings show that the effectiveness of financial stabilization
policy can vary depending on whether or not the economy is in a liquidity trap.
JEL Classification : E50, E52
Keywords : Zero interest rate policy, Financial stability, Credit expansion, Macro-
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1 Introduction
After the2008 financial crisis, unconventional monetary policy, such as zero-
interest-rate policy, and quantitative and qualitative easing have been conducted in
developed countries. Many papers have pointed out that these policy tools have
profound implications for stabilizing the economy in a liquidity trap（Eggertsson and
Woodford,2003; Adam and Billi,2006; Gertler and Karadi,2011）. Simultane-
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ously, the potential importance of financial stabilization, in particular, macropruden-
tial policy in terms of system and effectiveness, has been discussed extensively since
the financial crisis（Borio,2011; Drehmann et al.,2012; Jeanne,2016; Bianchi
and Mendoza,2018）.
In this paper, we investigate simply whether the effectiveness of financial
stabilization policy changes when an economy is in a liquidity trap. We introduce
the zero lower bound（ZLB）on the nominal interest rate into Suh’s（2014）model
incorporating financial friction a la Iacoviello（2005）and macroprudential policy.
The potential importance of Suh’s（2014）model is that monetary policy and
macroprudential policy is structured separately in the model framework. This
enables us to analyze the effectiveness of financial stabilization, distinguishing
macroprudential policy from monetary policy. In Suh’s（2014）model, the finan-
cial intermediary faces several costs : First, borrowers receive windfall income when
a loan is bad. This windfall income is financed by the financial intermediary’s cost,
which assumes increasing function of the loan. Second, the financial intermediary
faces the regulation of credit expansion. Financial intermediaries have to pay the
penalty cost if they violate the regulation. Finally, the financial intermediary has to
pay interest for a loan. The financial intermediary maximizes the profit subject to
these costs（constraints）. Due to this framework, policy rate and credit expansion
depend on both macroprudential policy and monetary policy.
We find that strong financial stabilization policy is effective in mitigating an
excess expansion of credit in normal times. However, this same strong stabilization
policy expands credit when the economy is in a liquidity trap. In our analysis,
higher financial regulation applies downward pressure on the nominal interest rate.
This makes the zero-interest rate policy longer, and financial stability worsens.
These findings show that the effectiveness of financial stabilization policy can vary
depending on whether or not the economy is in a liquidity trap.
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Recently, some papers introduce the ZLB into the model a la Iacoviello
（2005）: Rubio and Yao（2020）analyze the effectiveness of macroprudential policy
by defining macro-prudential policy as regulating the excess expansion of credit.
They show that monetary policy and macroprudential policy can perfectly coordinate
in stabilizing the economy in normal times, but this effectiveness of coordination
does not hold straightforwardly when the economy is in a liquidity trap. Unlike
Suh’s（2014）analysis, Rubio and Yao（2020）analyze the financial stabilization in
a unified framework of macroprudential policy and monetary policy. Our paper
complements the work of Rubio and Yao（2020）and Suh（2014）in terms of the
liquidity trap, as well as distinguishing between monetary policy and macropruden-
tial policy to show that strong financial stabilization policy can expand credit when
the economy is in a liquidity trap1）.
Recently, some studies have analyzed the effectiveness of macroprudential
policy in a liquidity trap : Antipa and Matheron（2014）and Wu and Zhang（2019）
show that a macroprudential policy can complement the forward-guidance in the
liquidity trap. Lewis and Villa（2016） demonstrate that capital regulation is
effective in a liquidity trap. Korinek and Simsek（2016）find that by limiting
debts, macroprudential policy can improve social welfare in a liquidity trap.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section2describes the model. In
Section 3, we explain the results by deriving impulse responses. Section 4
concludes the paper.
1）In analyses of the macroprudential policy, the borrowing and liquidity constraints are
introduced into households and banking sectors frequently : Farhi and Werning（2016）analyze
the macroprudential policy by introducing the borrowing constraint into the model with nominal
regidities in goods market and labor market. Gertler and Kiyotaki（2010）analyze performance
of the macroprudential policy by introducing the borrowing and liquidity constraint into the
banking sector.
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2 The model











































, , , , 	, and  denote consumption of saving households, consumption
of borrowers, inflation rate, nominal interest rate, borrowing rate, and debt of
borrowers（i. e., deposit of saving households）, respectively. Parameters , ,
, and  denote the subjective discount factor of saving households, subjective
discount factor of borrowers, relative risk aversion of saving households, relative
risk aversion of borrowers, and preference for labor supply, respectively. 

denotes degree of cost of financing the windfall income, and  denotes degree of
2）We describe the log-linearized model around the steady state. See appendix of the present
paper or Suh（2014）for detailed derivation of the model.
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response to debt in macroprudential policy. A higher means that macropruden-
tial regulation is tighter.  denotes debt-output ratio at the steady state ; 
denotes the real wage at the steady state ; and  denotes borrower’s labor
supply-output ratio at the steady state.
Equations（1）and（2）denote the Euler equation of saving households and
borrowers, re-spectively. These equations are derived from saving households’ and
borrowers’ intertemporal consumption decisions. Equation（3）denotes the Phillips
curve, which is derived from the firm’s optimal price setting.
Equations（4）and（5）are derived from the financial intermediary’s optimal
decision. As in Curdia and Woodford’s（2010）model, the financial intermediary
intermediates between saving households and borrowers, but this intermediation has
costs. Moreover, the financial intermediary cannot predict which loan will go bad,
but can know the fraction of bad loans to all loans. In Suh’s（2014）model, cost is
an increasing function of intermediation. Moreover, the financial intermediary
faces the regulation of macroprudential policy. Financial intermediaries must pay
the cost if they violate the regulation of credit expansion. Therefore, the financial
intermediary must maximize profits facing these two types of costs. Due to these
factors, the nominal interest rate（policy rate） and borrowing rate depend on
monetary policy and macroprudential policy. Finally, we note that . t is treated as
the credit expansion, i. e., degree of financial stability. A low credit expansion
means higher financial stability.
Monetary policy is given by following interest rate rule with ZLB.
		 （6）
where 	 denotes the real interest rate at the steady state, and  denotes the inertia
of the policy rate.
Finally, 
and  denote demand shock and productivity shock, respectively.
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 and  denote persistence of demand shock and productivity shock, respec-
tively.  and  are the i. i. d disturbance term.
3 Results
Parameters Values Explanation
 0．9922 Subjective discount factor（saving households）
 0．9893 Subjective discount factor（borrowers）
 1 Intertemporal substitution of consumption
 1 Preference for labor supply
 0．02 Degree of cost of paying windfall income
 0．17 Elasticity of inflation to real marginal cost
	
 1．5 Response to inflation rate in policy rule
	 0 Response to output in policy rule
	 0．1 Response to credit spread in macroprudential policy
 0．5 Persistence of demand shock
 0．5 Persistence of productivity shock
Std 0．1 Standard deviation of the shocks
Table1: Parameter Values
In this section, we derive the impulse responses to a negative demand
shock.3） Table1 indicates calibration. Following Suh（2014）, we set parameter
values as follows : , , , , , .
For policy parameters, we set 	
	, 	, and 	.4） We set 
3）See Miranda and Fackler（2004）for deriving impulse response with the ZLB.
4）Suh（2014）sets 		.
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, and set the standard deviation of the shock as . Debt-output ratio at
the steady state, the fraction of borrowers’ labor supply to aggregate labor supply,
consumption-output ratio, and output-aggregate labor supply ratio are set ,
, , and, respectively.
First, we analyze how financial stability changes by deriving the impulse
response to negative demand shock. Figure 1 shows the impulse responses to
Figure1: Impulse response to －8％ annual shock of ud,t
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－8％ annual shock of under and . According to the figure, the
nominal interest rate（policy rate）takes off from the ZLB smaller in the case of
than the case of . As previous studies have shown, such longer
zero interest rate policy is effective in the liquidity trap（Eggertsson and Woodford,
2003; Jung et al.,2005; Adam and Billi,2006; Nakov,2008）.
However, financial stability worsens when （Panel（b））. This is
Figure 2: Impulse response to －8％ annual shock of ud,t under ＝0 and
＝0．5（without a ZLB）
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because the delayed lift off from the ZLB decreases borrowing costs. Simultane-
ously, the economic agent expects the zero-interest rate policy will continue longer
due to the higher policy inertia and this amplifies the effect. Therefore, although
policy tools such as forward-guidance are effective in the liquidity trap to stabilize
the economic recession, they can worsen financial stability.
Figure 3: Impulse response to －8％ annual shock of ud,t under ＝0 and
＝0．5（with the ZLB）
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Next we analyze how degree of financial regulation  affects financial
stability. Figure2shows the impulse responses to －8％ annual shock of  under
and , where we do not impose a ZLB.5） As may be seen in the
figure, the credit response becomes smaller in the case of than of .
The financial stability improves as  increases. This result shows that financial
regulation is effective in stabilizing credit expansion. On the other hand, the
nominal interest rate decreases more when  than when . As
explained in the previous section, the nominal interest rate and credit are affected by
macroprudential policy. An increase in  applies a downward pressure on the
nominal interest rate, as shown by Eq.（5）.
Next we show that this result changes when we consider the effect of the ZLB
on the nominal interest rate. Figure3 shows that the impulse responses to －8％
annual shock of  under and , where we impose the ZLB on the
nominal interest rate. According to the figure, the credit response is larger when
than when . Moreover, zero-interest rate policy continues quite a
bit longer in the case of than the case of . Combining the result of
Figure2, an increase in  applies the downward pressure on the nominal interest
rate. This makes the zero interest rate policy last longer, and hence financial
stability worsens. Therefore, the effectiveness of macroprudential policy for
stabilizing credit expansion can change when the economy is in a liquidity trap.6）
4 Conclusion
This paper investigated how monetary policy in a liquidity trap affects financial
stability in a New Keynesian model incorporating a financial friction. We obtained
5）We set .
6）In appendix of the paper, we show that the result of Figure 3 changes under alternative
parameter values.
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findings as follows : A strong financial stabilization policy is effective in mitigating
a excess expansion of credit in a normal time. However, this strong stabilization
policy also expanded credit when the economy was in a liquidity trap. This shows
that the effectiveness of the financial stabilization policy could be altered depending
on whether or not the economy is in a liquidity trap.
However, we simplify the introduction of financial friction and macroprudential
policy. Therefore, we did not consider the role of the net worth of the firm sector
or financial sector（Bernanke et al.,1999; Gertler and Karadi,2011）. Moreover,
we imposed the ZLB on the policy rate only, not on the borrowing rate. Therefore,
we could not capture the effect of binding the ZLB in the borrowing rate. More
detailed analysis is needed on these issues.
Finally, we do not explain the intuition why higher financial regulation
decreases the policy rate more. It is difficult to consider that this mechanism is
robust. Therefore, we need further analysis on the relation between macropruden-
tial policy and the policy rate.
Appendix
A.1 Brief description of Suh（2014）
In this section, we present a brief overview of the Suh’s（2014）model. First,
household sector consists of saving households and borrowers. The saving
households are patient（i. e., higher subjective discount factor）, and the borrowers
impatient（i. e., lower subjective discount factor）.
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where, , , , , 	, 	, and  denote consumption of saving house-
holds, consumption of borrowers, deposit of saving households, debt of borrowers,
labor supply of saving households, and labor supply of borrowers, respec-
tively. 
 denotes saving households’ profit from the intermediate goods
sector. 
denotes the borrowers’ windfall income when the borrowing is bad.
Intermediate goods firm  produces 	 facing the monopolistic
competition. The final goods firm aggregates these goods. Optimal price-setting is
analogous to the standard New Keynesian model. Hence, we obtain the following
Phillips curve.
   （A.3）
where  denotes the real marginal costs. Finally, we describe the financial






	denotes the cost. The financial intermediary faces several costs :
First, the borrowers receive a windfall income when a loan is bad. This windfall
income is financed by the financial intermediary’s cost Ω. It is assumed that the
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cost Ω is an increasing function of the loan . Second, the financial intermediary
faces the regulation of credit expansion. The financial intermediary has to pay the
penalty cost Ξt if they violates the regulation. Analogous to Ω, we assume that Ξt
is an increasing function of . Finally, the financial intermediary has to pay
interest  on one unit of loan . Combining these costs, the financial
intermediary maximizes the profit（A.4）subject to the following constraints :
Ω Ξ   
Ω Ω 
Ξ Ξ 
Therefore, we treat  as the degree of financial stabilization policy. Solving this
problem yields the following relation :
Ω   （A.5）
Equation（A.5） shows that parameters of macroprudential policy affects the
borrowing rate .
A.2 Robustness
The case for and 
In this section, we derive the impulse responses to a negative demand shock
under alternative parameter values. We set 	
and following
Rotemberg and Woodford（1997）and Woodford（2003）.
First, we analyze how financial stability changes by deriving the impulse
response to the negative demand shock. Figure A4 shows the impulse responses to
－8％ annual shock of  under 	
, , 	, and 	.
The result does not change from Figure1. The nominal interest rate（policy rate）
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takes off from the ZLB smaller in the case of  than of.
Analogous to Figure1, the financial stability worsens when . This is
because the delayed lift off from the ZLB decreases the borrowing costs. The
economic agent expects that the zero interest rate policy will continue longer due to
the higher policy inertia. Therefore, policy tools such as forward-guidance can
Figure A4: Impulse response to －8％ annual shock of （＝1／6．25, ＝
0．024）
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worsen the financial stability.
Next we also analyze how degree of financial regulation  affects the financial
stability. Figure A5 shows the impulse responses to －12％ annual shock of 
under and , where we do not impose the ZLB.7） Analogous to
Figure2, the response of the credit becomes smaller under the case of than
Figure A5: Impulse response to －12％ annual shock of under ＝1／6．25,
＝0．024, ＝0, and ＝0．5（without the ZLB）
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under the case of . The financial stability improves as  increases. This
result shows that the financial regulation is effective to stabilize the credit expansion
under alternative parameter values. Moreover, the nominal interest rate decreases
7）We set the value of the shock －12％ so that the nominal interest rate binds the ZLB.
Figure A6: Impulse response to －12％ annual shock of under ＝1／6．25,
＝0．024, ＝0, and ＝0．5（with the ZLB）
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more under the case of than under the case of . This is also same
as Figure2.
Next we show that this result changes when we consider the ZLB on the
nominal interest rate. Figure A6 shows that the impulse responses to －12％
annual shock of under , , , and , where we
impose the ZLB on the nominal interest rate. The result changed from the result of
Figure 3. According to the figure, credit responds slightly larger until second
quarter, but decrease more after second quarter in the case of than the case
of . Moreover, the zero interest rate policy continues longer in the case of
than in the case of , but the nominal interest rate policy increases
faster in the case of than of . This large overshoot tightens the
credit expansion. Therefore, the effectiveness of stronger financial stabilization
policy is improved in the liquidity trap under  and .
Combining the result of Figure A5, whether the effectiveness of the macroprudential
policy depends parameter values other than policy parameters.
The case for 
Finally, we set policy parameter alternative value. We set 	, which the
interest rate responds higher to the inflation rate. Figure A7shows that the impulse
responses to －12％ annual shock of  under 	, , ,
, and , where we impose the ZLB on the nominal interest rate. The
result did not change from the result of Figure A6. According to the figure, credit
responds slightly larger until second quarter, but decrease more after second quarter
in the case of than of . Moreover, the zero interest rate policy
continues longer under the case of than in the case of , but the
nominal interest rate policy increases faster in the case of of .
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